Indian Law by Law Review, Denver University
Denver Law Review 
Volume 68 
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 28 
February 2021 
Indian Law 
Denver University Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Denver University Law Review, Indian Law, 68 Denv. U. L. Rev. 695 (1991). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
INDIAN LAW
Blatchford v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Blatchford, filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the
state of New Mexico lacked jurisdiction to try him for his offenses. The
Federal Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, gives exclusive jurisdiction
to the federal government for crimes committed within either an Indian
reservation or a dependent Indian community. In a companion case, it
was determined that the area in question did not have reservation status.
Therefore, the only issue remaining to be decided was whether the area
where Blatchford committed his offenses was a dependent Indian com-
munity within the meaning of the statute.
The Tenth Circuit found that the area was not a dependent Indian
community. In making this determination, the court considered land ti-
tle, community composition and purpose, and the relationship of the
community to the federal government, the Indian nation, and the state
and county government. The court found that most of the land was pri-
vately owned, that the inhabitants included many non-Indians, and that
the primary purpose of the community was commercial activity. Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that Congress did not intend to include an Indian
allotment clustered around a non-Indian commercial junction on private
land as a dependent Indian community.
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company ("P&M"),
sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. P&M claimed that de-
fendant, Navajo Tribe Tax Commission (the "Tribe"), lacked jurisdic-
tion under federal law to tax a P&M mine on land located in
northwestern New Mexico. The land in question was an addition of ap-
proximately 1.9 million to the Navajo Reservation in 1907-08. P&M,
however, stated that the addition was terminated by two Executive Or-
ders in 1908 and 1911 thereby depriving the Tribe ofjurisdiction to tax
mines located on this land. The Tribe argued that the land in question
was still part of the Navajo Reservation and, therefore, the taxation issue
should first be addressed by Tribal forums. Accordingly, the federal
court should abstain under the "Indian abstention doctrine." Alterna-
tively, the Tribe claimed that the Indian abstention doctrine was still
applicable because the land was located within "Indian country." The
district court held that the land was within Reservation boundaries and,
therefore, the Indian abstention doctrine applied. P&M subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the land
was within Reservation boundaries. The court based its decision on the
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language and legislative history of two Executive Orders and the Act of
May 29, 1908. The court ruled that the phrase "restore to public do-
main" was widely interpreted as diminishing or terminating the bounda-
ries of the New Mexico portion of unallotted land. While this land
originally was withdrawn from the public domain in an effort to allot
land to off-reservation Indians, these Executive Orders and legislation
returned the land to the public domain. Therefore, the land was not
within Reservation boundaries. The court then remanded the case for a
finding of whether the land was nevertheless in Indian country and, if so,
whether the Indian tribunal should first hear the taxation question.
Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Ross, brought two fourth amendment claims against de-
fendant, McLemore, deputy sheriff. Ross alleged that McLemore vio-
lated his rights when he arrested him on Indian Tribal Trust land. Ross
claimed that state police officers have no jurisdiction in Indian country.
Further, Ross asserted a constitutional claim based on McLemore's al-
leged use of excessive force in making the arrest.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that McLemore did not have authority to
arrest Ross in Indian country. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1152, Indian
country held in trust for Indian use is subject to exclusive federal or
tribal criminal jurisdiction. Thus, the county, its sheriff, or his inferior
officers could not exercise jurisdiction for the state. Notwithstanding
the lack ofjurisdiction to arrest Ross, McLemore, as an individual peace
officer, still enjoyed qualified immunity because no reasonable police of-
ficer could have known such an action violated the law. The court up-
held the directed verdict, but remanded for trial a separate claim for
extra-jurisdictional arrest against the county. The court reasoned that
the county enjoyed no such qualified immunity. The county can be held
liable only if the constitutional deprivation resulted from county custom
or policy.
Shoshone Indian Tribe v. Hodel, 903 F.2d 784
Author: Judge Babcock, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Shoshone Indian Tribe ("Tribe") brought suit against de-
fendant, Hodel, Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary"), Atlantic Rich-
field Company, and several other oil companies ("ARCO"). The Tribe
asserted that ARCO improperly deducted manufacturing costs before
computing the royalty owed to it for mineral leases on tribal lands.
Under the United States Geological Survey, Conservation Division Man-
ual Part 647.7.3(D), manufacturing costs are deductible only if the Sec-
retary determines that such costs are an "integral part" of the
manufacturing process. The Secretary determined that ARCO's manu-
facturing costs were not an integral part of the manufacturing process
and, thus, were not deductible. The district court upheld the Secretary's
determination. ARCO appealed, arguing that the Secretary developed a
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long standing policy of allowing the costs because past deduction of sim-
ilar manufacturing costs were never rejected as improper.
The Tenth Circuit held that a long standing policy can only be
found where an administrative agency interprets a regulation consist-
ently over a long period of time, publicly, and through careful and
sound reasoning. The court reasoned that the Secretary's prior acquies-
cence did not meet the criteria in establishing a long standing policy
since ARCO's deductions had never before been challenged. There-
fore, the Secretary has wide discretion in determining the deductibility
of such costs.

